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Love and rage, I believe, motivate feminist work in law, both in advo-
cacy and in the academy. Love and rage not only move us to action, but
they also inform a feminist sense of justice and of morality. This emo-
tional root alone of feminist work in law renders it threatening and alien
to mainstream legal discourse. As a consequence, mainstream legal dis-
course constitutes a tremendously powerful censor of feminist feeling, as
well as substantive feminist views on law. The very presence, not to men-
tion the dominance, of mainstream legal discourse and the disciplines it
fosters oppress as they "discipline" the feelings that motivate and to some
degree even define feminist legal practice and theory.
The main purpose of this paper is simply to suggest that feminist law-
yers, judges and legal theorists feel, live with, internalize, respond to, ac-
cept, or rebel against the active oppression of these two feelings-love and
rage-constantly. More specifically, what I want to identify in this paper
are some of the ways that our developing feminist legal scholarship itself
evidences the existence of oppressive and disciplining forces which have
the effect and often the expressed intent of marginalizing the feelings that
motivate feminist legal work. My claim is that feminist legal scholarship
distinctively shows that we have unwittingly internalized as well as quite
consciously rebelled against, the dominant legal culture's condemnation of
the emotional root of our work. As I will show, both reactions are partial:
the same piece of feminist scholarship-indeed the same paragraph-often
evidences both internalization of the discipline and liberation from it at
the same time. But both responses evidence the dominance of an essen-
tially masculine view of the relation of affect to action, of emotion to rea-
son, of particular to universal, of context to principle, of nature to culture,
and of self to other, that is threatened to the core by the affective root and
motives of feminist legal work and by its substantive content. The result-
ing oppression and repression of feminist feeling can do a great deal of
psychic damage. Perhaps naming and identifying that damage may to
some degree militate against it.
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First, before I catalog some of the ways our most powerful feelings are
repressed, let me give a few examples of what I mean by the claim that
love and rage motivate as well as define feminist legal work, and a few
examples of the very different emotional grounding of masculine jurispru-
dence. During the last decade, a growing number of feminist legal theo-
rists, following feminist moral philosophers and psychologists,' have ar-
gued that it is our "connectedness" to others, and not our detachment
from them, which render us moral creatures, and that it is therefore an
"ethic of care"-an ethic premised on our capacity for empathy, sympa-
thy, or love-and not an ethic of rights, which must be the heart of a
morally acceptable legal regime (assuming optimistically we will one day
have one).' This claim alone (which I awkwardly have called elsewhere a
"cultural-legal feminist" commitment)3 distinguishes our developing "uto-
pian" feminist jurisprudence from the idealistic or utopian strands of all
three major contemporary jurisprudential movements: liberal legalism, ec-
onomic legalism, and the critical legal studies movement. In contrast to
liberal legalists,4 these feminist legal scholars insist it is the heart and not
the head, the ability to particularize, not generalize, one's sensitivity to
context and not one's ability to transcend it, the ability to connect, iden-
tify, understand, and sympathize with the different and particular other,
and not the ability to "see past" those differences to some universal es-
sence, which is the basis of any morally ideal conception of "The Rule of
Law." In contrast to legal economists,' cultural feminists insist that it is
the capacity for trust and sense of responsibility which will facilitate a
progressive and economically just legal order, rather than a relentless self-
interest which necessitates a libertarian but regressive one. And finally,
contra the critical legal scholar,' at least some feminists claim that it is our
very natural and concrete biological, emotional and social connection to
other human beings and not, as the critical legal scholar insists, a socially
constructed and effervescent inclination toward "community", which car-
ries the promise of a political and legal realm infused by an ethic of care.
While love informs a feminist sense of morality, and hence of ideal con-
ceptions of law, rage informs the feminist sense of justice. We are en-
raged, and we are moved to act, by our identification with the gendered
injuries that distinctively destroy women's selfhood and security, typically
1. See C. Gilligan, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOP-
MENT (1982); N. Noddings, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION
(1984).
2. See e.g., Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH L. REV. 1574 (1987); Kornhauser, The
Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 465 (1987).
3. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987).
4. Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175 (1986); Wechsler, Toward Neu-
tral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
5. R. Posner, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
6. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
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with the full endorsement of legalism. The feminist legal scholar's own
victimization-her knowledge that she too has been hurt by the social
practices she condemns-is absolutely crucial to her sense of the injustice
of the injuries she litigates, adjudicates or analyzes, for it is crucial to her
understanding of these injuries as injuries.' The necessary by-product of
that shared victimization, however-the sense of oneself as a victim as
well as a lawyer or theorist-is rage, clean and simple. Feminist rage is
thus indispensable to a feminist sense of justice: it evidences the theorist's
understanding of herself and of other women as having been unjustly
rather than deservedly injured.
The feeling of rage that informs a feminist sense of justice sharply dis-
tinguishes feminist feeling from that which moves mainstream legal dis-
course. This is easier to see in advocacy and adjudication than in the acad-
emy: the feminist lawyer or judge is inescapably litigating or adjudicating
practices which hurt her as well as whatever client or interest she is rep-
resenting, or whatever litigant she is judging, thus violating the lay as well
as professional sense that it is somewhat unwise to be a lawyer in one's
own cause, and certainly improper to be a judge in one's own case. But
this conflict between the mainstream and feminist emotional root of justice
pervades theory as well as practice. The feminist legal scholar's concep-
tion of justice is through and through informed by her understanding of
herself as part of a collectivity of victims of injurious practices. That un-
derstanding in turn depends crucially upon her awareness of herself as a
member of a collectivity defined by gender and injury, and of her identity
as in no small part a function of the group membership.
The centrality of these experiences of shared injury, victimization, and
the rage to which they lead, to the feminist sense of justice, no less than
the centrality of an ethic of care to feminist jurisprudence, also renders
feminist legal scholarship incommensurate with mainstream legal theory.
For more than any other conviction, the vision of "impartial justice" as
requiring a neutral arbiter to weigh the conflicting rights (for the lib-
eral), 8 interests (for the economist), 9 or ideals (for the critical legal
scholar)"0 unifies the otherwise diverse strands of contemporary legal
scholarship. For most, if not all, contemporary jurisprudence, the neutral-
ity that justice definitionally requires precludes the sense of engagement,
identification, connection, participation, shared victimization, and collec-
tive rage that inform feminist conceptions of justice.
Underlying this disjunction between the feelings that motivate feminist
and mainstream legal scholarship is an even more fundamental cleavage
7. I have explored this elsewhere. West, Women's Hedonic Lives, 3 Wsc. WOMEN'S L. J. 81
(1987).
8. Brest, supra note 4.
9. R. Posner, supra note 5.
10. Kennedy, supra note 6.
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between the existential situation-the position in the world-of the femi-
nist legal scholar and the masculine legal scholar. It is the lived reality of
physical, emotional and psychic intersubjectivity with others which under-
lies the two emotions-love and rage-that motivate the feminist sense of
morality and justice respectively and hence of feminist legal theory. From
a feminist point of view, this is unsurprising: the overwhelmingly perva-
sive theme of feminist scholarship in law and elsewhere of the last two
decades is that the experience and fact of intersubjectivity-of connec-
tion-is central to women's self identity. If that is right, then it is surely
central to the feminist legal scholar's identity as well."1
By contrast, judging from the works and words of liberal, economic and
critical legal scholars themselves, it seems to be the brute necessity of sepa-
rateness from the other that underlies the collection of "emo-
tions"-detachment, selfishness, and a pervasive sense of alienation from
others-that motivate mainstream conceptions of justice, morality, and le-
gal theory. The liberal, economic and critical scholars, of course, have
widely differing responses to their experience of the necessity of separation
from the other: the liberal regards the experience of separateness as the
core of a detached-and hence principled and moral-regime of legal-
ism;1  the economist celebrates the selfishness to which separateness gives
rise;"3 and the critical legal scholar seeks to overcome the sense of aliena-
tion from others to which his separateness commits him through mystical
transcendence (the celebrated "intersubjective zap" of Roll Over Beetho-
ven fame) or communitarian conversations. 4 But they are all, distinc-
tively, committed to a vision of the self and hence of themselves as necessa-
rily separate from the other. That shared commitment alone puts all of
their work at odds with our developing feminist legal scholarship.
The difference between the emotional and existential commitments of
mainstream and feminist legal work, combined with the dominance of the
former over the latter, results in the repression of both intersubjectivist
feminist ideas, and intersubjectivist feminist feelings. The most severe, and
also the most visible technique for repression in the legal academy, of
course, is as always the refusal to hire and tenure. Less severe but just as
overtly repressive disciplinary techniques also proliferate just under the
surface. Not the least of these is the extensive and unsupervised edits of
manuscripts by the student-editors who manage the major law reviews."'
11. Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody
Decisionmaking 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988); Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out
of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); Henderson, Legality
and Empathy, supra note 2; Kornhauser, supra note 2; Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
12. R. Nozick, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); R. Dworkin, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
13. R. Posner, supra note 5.
14. Kennedy & Gabel, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
15. This experience is not, of course, limited to women, but women authors may have or be
perceived to have less authorial authority in the negotiation process with editors of the major reviews.
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A close examination of these overtly repressive techniques could show
many different things, but certainly one pattern that might emerge from
such a study is that feminist scholarship that concentrates on virtually any
manifestation of the human potential for intersubjectivity-from preg-
nancy itself, to the possibility of intersubjective knowledge, and the rele-
vance of either (or both) the experience of shared victimization or an ethic
of care to legal decision-making and legal ideals-is for that reason alone
vulnerable to censor.
Hirings, firings, tenure battles, and edits, however, are open and
pitched fights. They do their own damage, which is extensive, but I want
to focus on something else: the covertly repressive messages condemning
and "disciplining" our feelings. My claim is that we have to some degree
internalized as well as rebelled against at least two of these messages, and
the resulting schizophrenic posture we harbor toward our own feelings is
well-evidenced by our work. The first such censorial message is that the
"ethic of care" first identified by Gilligan, Noddings,"' and others, and
which now plays a fairly large role in feminist legal scholarship, is not
really "up to the hard task" of legal decision-making: that legal analysis
moved by an ethic of care just cannot do the hard work of legal analysis
moved by a morality of reason, principle and detached respect. The second
message is the profoundly silencing claim that our victimization by the
practices we seek to eradicate and the rage to which that victimization
gives rise, disable us from an adequate and objective understanding of
those practices. Therefore, we are told, for reasons of justice, as well as
reasons of status, we ought to forgo family law, rape law, and discrimina-
tion law, and instead concern ourselves in our writing with "neutral",
hard-law topics in which we do not have such a "personal stake". I will
give one example each of the way that our emerging feminist scholarship
evidences that we have both internalized and rebelled against both of these
messages. The first example will concern the substance of our developing
feminist legal theory, and the second concerns its formal and stylistic
distinctiveness.
First, I think there is a pervasive and disabling ambiguity in the recent
feminist legal scholarship, including my own, inspired by Carol Gilligan's
work, concerning the importance of judicial and legal empathic sensitivity
to "differences" between people." Although tremendously important, the
ambiguity in much of this scholarship shows that we have partially inter-
nalized as well as rebelled against the repressive message that a morality
Many of us have had devastating experiences with censorial student editors, but only Patricia Wil-
liams, to my knowledge, has written or spoken of this experience publicly. Speech by Patricia Wil-
liams, Critical Legal Studies Annual Conference, (Fall 1988).
16. See, e.g., C. Gilligan, supra note 1; N. Noddings, supra note 1.
17. Minow, supra note 11; Henderson, Legality and Empathy, supra note 2; Littleton, Recon-
structing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279 (1987); West, Women's Hedonic Lives, supra
note 7.
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based upon an ethic of care cannot insure morally decent legal decision-
making. Let me make the point analytically. My complaint is that some of
this recent feminist legal scholarship fluctuates fairly explicitly, although
not always clearly, between two very different positions regarding the re-
lationship of empathy, sympathy, and care, to legal decision-making. The
first position, which I call the "cognitive" position, is that an empathic
understanding of the differences of others (whether the "others" be
women, Fundamentalist Christians threatened by Darwinian hegemony in
the public schools, people of color, the differently abled, or "pregnant per-
sons") constitutes an important source of information about the totality of
persons who will be affected by a legal decision. Without this sensitivity to
difference and context, decision-making will be apparently rational, but
in fact skewed.18 The second position, which is much more threatening to
mainstream legal discourse, and which I call the "moral" position, is that
empathic understanding of and sensitivity to the context in which differ-
ently situated others find themselves is but one aspect of a truly caring
relationship with those others, even if the relationship is as fleeting and
bureaucratized as judge-litigant. Empathic understanding is therefore es-
sential to any moral response to that person's situation, including re-
sponses prompted by legalism.19 When we care about the "differences" of
others in this second sense, we do so because we are moved to lessen their
burden, not just understand it. Sensitivity to difference is part of the work
of sympathizing with the pain of others to work towards lessening that
pain.
Now there are several ways to characterize the difference between these
two positions, some of which can be readily assimilated into distinctions
within mainstream legal theory. For example, we might describe the dif-
ference between them in this way: the cognitive position outlines a role for
empathy which is necessary to "formal justice," while the moral position
outlines a role for care which facilitates "substantive justice." To switch
contexts for a moment, the cognitive claim can be fairly characterized as
an adequate account of the consciousness required for the first wave of the
civil rights movement: the fight for equal treatment and equal opportu-
nity. The moral position, on the other hand, might be the necessary con-
sciousness for more redistributive intervention into the racist presumptions
and workings of this culture's institutions, such as affirmative action.
The difference between the cognitive and moral understandings of the
role of empathy in decision-making which I want to stress, however, is
that the cognitive interpretation accommodates and to some degree rein-
forces the mainstream insistence that legal decision-making, to be just,
must be grounded in reason, principle, and generality, while the moral
18. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, supra note 2; Minow, supra note 11.
19. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, supra note 2.
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interpretation quite overtly rebels against that insistence.20 Read mini-
mally, the cognitive position only demands that the legal decision-makers
do what the mainstream scholar has always said they should do, but that
they do it better: that they be equipped with more knowledge, empathi-
cally acquired, of the subjects of their analysis. The moral position does
much more: it reclaims love as the root of morality. This is a much harder
position to maintain, and it meets with infinitely greater resistance from
mainstream legal scholars than the first. It constitutes a far greater threat
to the dominant paradigm of reason, rationality and principle as the heart
of justice. That we put forward the moral claim so much more tentatively
than we put forward the cognitive claim when we discuss the relevance of
the ethic of care to legal decision-making may reflect the force of the
mainstream repression of feeling and the extent to which we have inter-
nalized it, rather than our "unbiased" assessment of the moral position's
merit.
The second way that feminist legal scholarship evidences the external
condemnation of the feelings that motivate it is formal rather than sub-
stantive. Feminist legal scholarship that focuses on particular gendered
injuries is increasingly marked by a distinctive style: feminist legal writers
who have written about particular injuries increasingly include some ver-
sion of the narrative of their own victimization.21 We do this, I think,
because of our conviction that these narratives are essential to the substan-
tive analysis we are trying to convey. Yet at the same time, the style in
which we present these narratives records our hesitancy over even their
relevance, much less their centrality. In a great deal of this scholarship,
our narratives, and the first person voice that tells them, are set apart in
some way from the rest of the article's "text". The narrative appears in a
footnote," or in a "preface" to the legal analysis that follows in the "real
text, ' or, as in my own work, in the text, but literally bracketed-inside
brackets.24 This bracketed retelling of the first person narratives of victim-
ization reflects two very real, and very contradictory imperatives. On the
one hand, we know that our own experience of these practices and our
retelling of these experiences in narrative is absolutely essential to our
own as well as others' understanding of the acts themselves as harmful.
On the other hand, we know that this narrative voice is impermissible in
legal analysis. The bracketing of these narratives thus has a dual signifi-
cance: it evidences the extent to which we have partially internalized as
well as rebelled against the mainstream insistence that our own under-
20. Id.; Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988).
21. Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37
STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985); West, Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 7.
22. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, supra note 21.
23. Estrich, supra note 21.
24. West, Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 7.
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standing of ourselves as victims of the practices we wish to eradicate dis-
ables us from objective legal analysis.
Bracketed narratives in recent feminist legal scholarship about gendered
injuries reflect the necessity of simultaneously complying with both of
these conflicting imperatives. We do include our stories, and we do write
in the narrative voice, but that voice is muffled and the stories are trun-
cated. The presence of a story of victimization or of the first person singu-
lar in a law review article is always a victory of some dimension against
the dominance of a false and partial "objectivity" in legal discourse. But
the practice of bracketing, footnoting, and prefacing these stories also par-
tially reinforces-even while the content of what is bracketed, footnoted
and prefatory, challenges-the complacent and usually false belief that the
objective legal analysis contained in the "real text" of the piece can be
understood on its own: that legal analysis can be read apart from-indeed
"abstracted from"-the intensely subjective and intersubjective narrative
from which it came.
There are at least two reasons that this truncating of the narrative voice
of victimization in our feminist legal writing both hurts us, and hurts our
writing. To put the point affirmatively, there are two reasons why we
should expand the narrative voice and integrate it into the text of our
legal analysis. First, liberating the narrative voice and merging our stories
of victimization into the text of our legal analysis might improve our abil-
ity to communicate to the non-feminist legal audience. We need to tell our
own stories in order to communicate the quality, the intensity, the serious-
ness, and the magnitude-as opposed to simply the fact-of the invisible
injuries from which relatively silenced women daily suffer. It is simply not
true that the analytic voice abstracted from a narrative account can com-
municate the seriousness or scope of harms which are "invisible" to the
mainstream culture, such as incest, marital rape, sexual harassment, street
hassling, or unwanted pregnancy. The second reason that we should push
ourselves and our editors to liberate our narrative voice is that when we
bracket, footnote, preface, truncate or omit altogether the stories of our
own victimization by the practices we analyze, we participate in the re-
pression of our own deserved rage. When we do so, we not only alienate
ourselves as well as our readers from the affective root of our work, but
we also deprive ourselves of a potent communicative tool: by communicat-
ing the rage which a societal practice has occasioned in us, we show in a
very simple and direct way the profundity and intensity of the injury. Of
course we need to document the severity, intensity and magnitude of these
injuries in other ways as well. But by neglecting the full narrative of our
own injuries-complete with expressions of the rage to which those inju-
ries give or gave rise-we neglect a time-tested and honorable way of
communicating the intensity of subjective pain, and of inspiring the moral
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and legal imperatives of sympathy and care which that pain ought trigger
in the "other".
Of course, it is not surprising that feminist legal scholars repress and to
some degree distrust the feelings that motivate our work. Obviously, the
feelings that motivate feminist legal scholarship have never been regarded
as a legitimate source of conceptions of morality or justice. And of course,
that grossly understates the problem: women's emotional lives are vilified,
ridiculed, trivialized, hated and feared in all spheres of life, not just the
narrowly legal. But what follows is that in legal theory as elsewhere, fem-
inists must guard against the ever-present temptation to participate in and
internalize this condemnation of our distinctive inner selves. For this re-
pression of the legitimacy and intensity of our feelings does us tremendous
psychic harm, which is only magnified by our unwitting collaboration.
We need to refuse to honor the claims about the limits of an ethic of care
that are themselves entrenched in misogynist hatred and fear: the claim
that an ethic of care is sentimental, tribalist, or-perversely-both; the
claim that love, care, sensitivity and concern for others threatens the indi-
vidualistic respect which the law holds dear, that the heart cannot guard
against its own excesses, or that it cannot discriminate or respond to ne-
cessity. We have no reason to acquiesce in these condemnations. We have
not yet even articulated-much less put into practice-a vision of judg-
ing, representation, and adjudication based on an ethic of care rather than
detachment, or a theory of law grounded in love rather than in egotism
tempered by reason. We have not even articulated, much less tested in
practice, our hearts' strengths. Until we do, we should be wary of the
censorial voice inside as well as around us that tells us that our hearts are
too dangerously sentimental to even try.
Similarly, we should trust our rage a little more, and our internalized
repression of that rage a whole lot less. We should refuse to honor main-
stream demands of objectivity and detachment that disable us from femi-
nist methods of narrative expression that we know have worked for
women in the past, and that we know to have worked in large part be-
cause they move us to an enraged response to our injuries instead of a
belittling self-contempt. As we know from our daily work lives, the sup-
pression of feminist rage means that we respond coolly in conversation
only to shake with rage in our private offices, that we argue at work and
cry at home, and that we differentially suffer countless sleepless nights
because of interactions that are virtually unnoticed and invisible to others.
As we know, this "differential sleeplessness" over office politics belittles as
well as ages us. When we acquiesce in the suppression of our rage in our
writing, we also injure and belittle ourselves, although the fuse is longer
and the effect more difficult to discern. But we lose something else as well
when we acquiesce in the suppression of rage. To date, we have neither
fully articulated nor adequately defended our feminist conception of legal
1989)
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justice. That may be because we deny its emotional root. To date, we have
not tasted the fruits of our forbidden, suppressed, and often forgotten rage
over the gendered injuries we have sustained, or the implications of that
rage for "a theory of justice." Until we do, we should be wary of the
many voices, both inside and around us, that insist that this rage must be
cooled or extinguished, if feminists are to participate as theorists or law-
yers in our societal quest for justice.
